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Abstract 
This article addresses the question how the financial and economic crisis  that hit the US in 
the late 2000s impacted on immigration policies. Drawing on Kingdon’s multiple streams 
model and combining it with the notion of two-level games, we find that while the policy 
stream and the problem stream would call for both restrictive and liberalising changes, the 
political stream impedes change: The fact that Congress is since long divided over a 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) impedes any restrictive or liberalising changes. 
With problems resulting from current policies being intensified through the global economic 
crisis, however, actors favouring either restrictive or liberal policy change look for alternative 
venues to pursue their policy aims. Through legislative changes on the state level or via 
executive orders by the president, policies can be changed on a lower level without a CIR.    
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1. Introduction 
The global economic and financial crisis since 2008 has proved to be a major challenge for 
the Western world. It entailed both a rise in unemployment rates and a decrease in public 
spending in many European countries and the United States (US).  
 External shocks like economic crises have been found to substantially impact 
immigration policies in the past. Given the rise in unemployment and the decreased demand 
in labour force, crises can be expected to evoke “a climate conducive to a restrictive regime” 
(Beets/Willekens 2009: 6; Newton 2008: 60). Points in case are the Depression of 1920/21 in 
the US and the economic downturn following the Oil crisis in 1970s which both led to 
implementation of restrictive immigration policies (Hatton/Williamson 2009). Yet, at the 
same time a crisis also pronounces the hardships of illegal immigrants that have no access to 
social benefits and thus suffer significantly when losing their occupation. The recent crisis has 
been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression by the International 
Monetary Fund (The Guardian 10 April 2008) and can thus be expected to have significantly 
impacted on immigration policies in the US, as the US was hit particularly hard by the crisis 
(Huffington Post 21 June 2012; The Atlantic 20 March 2013). Effects of the crisis are 
observed in the years from 2008 to 2012, the time crisis indicators such as a rise in 
unemployment and GDP decrease were particularly salient. This article aims at answering the 
question of how the global economic crisis has impacted US immigration policies.  
We find that while there is no policy change induced by Congress, substantive changes on 
the state levels and through Presidential Executive Orders can be observed. While policy 
change is blocked through deadlock in Congress, pressures from their constituencies for either 
liberal or restrictive changes make politicians search for alternative venues to realise their 
policy aims.  
We argue that this situation can be explained based on both venue-shopping as introduced 
by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and the multiple streams model suggested by Kingdon 
(1995): While both the policy stream (i.e. policy ideas that are present among politicians and 
experts) and the problem stream (i.e. the non-functionality of the current immigration system) 
would call for change, the political situation of deadlock in Congress impedes change. The 
reason for impeded change is that both actors with liberal preferences and actors with 
restrictive preferences present in the Congress rather have incentives for defection than 
cooperation on the issue matter, as defection results in more favourable policy outcomes for 
each of them: They can rather accept the absence of policy change they desire than they are 
willing to adopt changes of the status quo based on the policy preferences of their adversaries. 
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Thus, proponents of restrictive change, such as political actors from US states that are 
affected over proportionally by illegal immigration, foster restrictive change on the local level 
and adopt policy aiming at immigration control enforcement that has so far been blocked in 
Congress (Steil/Vasi 2014). In contrast, examples for liberal change are the executive orders 
lanced by President Obama aiming at temporal legalisations of undocumented immigrants.  
With this study we aim to contribute to the wider debate on whether external shocks do 
entail either restrictive or liberalising policy change. Our core finding is that while external 
shocks create pressures for change, these pressures need to be taken up by political actors to 
be transformed into actual policy change. Where change does not happen, pressures for 
change look for alternative venues and entail a politicisation of the issue. This study is based 
on an analysis of literature as well as policy documents on a number of decisions that have 
been made in the immigration policy area in the US between 2008 and 2012. In addition, we 
have conducted 15 interviews in fall 2012, at the height of the economic crisis, in  which 
collective actors such as unions and employers but also politicians and think tanks elaborated 
on what they considered viable policies in times of crisis.1  
 
2.  Multiple Streams and Venue-Shopping as a theoretical framework to study 
policy change in times of crisis 
We aim at explaining the impact of the crisis on US immigration policies by drawing on 
Kingdon’s multiple streams approach and combining it with the venue-shopping theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). According to Kingdon (1995) policy change can be explained 
by a convergence of the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. 
Analogously, the lack of change is based on an absence of this convergence. In line with 
Kingdon, the problem stream means the issue or the policy problem to be addressed. The 
policy stream covers the policy ideas that aim at its solution. The politics stream is the 
institutional setting and the political actors involved. In this article we argue that the absence 
of a political stream favourable to change can account for the policy deadlock that we observe 
in US immigration policies in Congress. Moreover, we argue that the absence of such a 
favourable political stream can be best explained drawing on the deadlock game in game 
theory. Following this model non-cooperation is most beneficial to all actors involved, both 
individually and collectively, which eventually leads to policy stasis. Yet, given the immense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  We	  thank	  Heike	  Brabandt	  for	  undertaking	  the	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  Steffen	  Mau	  from	  University	  of	  Bremen	  for	  
initiating	  research	  on	  the	  US.	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pressures for change by their constituencies, which were amplified through the economic 
crisis, proponents of change look for alternative venues to pursue their aims. Thus, we 
contribute to the empirically rich body of literature on policy stasis in the US 
(Mansbridge/Martin 2013; McCarthy 2007) by adding a yet missing theoretical explanation 
for this state of affairs.  
 
According to the multiple streams model the policy stream concerns policy ideas that are 
constantly around in what Kingdon calls the “policy primeval soup” (Kingdon 1995: 116). 
These policy ideas are usually based on different preferences: While some actors might be 
more concerned about immigrants’ effective access to rights, others might favour a limitation 
of immigration levels or aim at more selectivity in immigrant admission. Based on these 
preferences actors build ideas of both causal relationships (i.e. about what is) and what could 
be policy responses. The policy ideas thus are solutions which they can sell to decision-
makers. Yet, it needs crucial events for these policy ideas to get noticed and gain political 
weight (Kingdon 1995: 113). Further, an ambivalent stance toward immigrants is a recurrent 
feature in the US discourse on immigration (Newton 2008: 1). At the same time, immigrants 
are seen as “villainous invaders” and “heroic founders” (ibid.). Thus, a crisis entailing a rise 
in numbers of unemployment can arguably help particularly promoters of restriction of 
immigration gain ground (Newton 2008: 60). These could use the event to argue for a cut in 
immigration to ensure a stronger protection of national workers. Simultaneously, a crisis 
highlights the hardship undergone by illegal immigrants. Yet, to implement change and 
restriction or liberalisation of policies the political stream has to come in as well. The political 
stream comprises things such as “the public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, 
partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administration” (Kingdon 
1995: 145). The increasing number of Latino voters has been found to put pressure on the 
Democrats for introducing liberalising changes for the legalisation of their yet ‘illegally’ 
staying family and friends. In 2005, for instance, 84% of the Latino population supported the 
legalisation through the so-called ‘path to citizenship’ (Suro 2005: 10). We argue that it is 
particularly the political stream which impedes change in Congress through deadlock. 
According to game theory in a deadlock game the actors involved in the game benefit rather 
from the defection than from cooperation. In this sense the game is a zero sum game. Each 
actor would benefit most in case of their own defection and the cooperation of the other actor. 
Yet, the second best outcome for both actor 1 and actor 2 would be that both of them defect. 
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The least beneficial outcome for either of them would be obviously their own cooperation and 
the defection of the other actor. Thus, an outcome where both of them defect is highly likely.  
 
Yet, with the crisis, the problem stream that supports the preferences of proponents of both 
liberal and restrictive change intumesces and their policy ideas face a rising demand with the 
electorate at least in some highly affected states (Fetzer 2006). Thus, with deadlock in 
Congress, politicians need to look for alternative political venues (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993) to pursue their aims and satisfy their constituencies. Generally, Republicans prefer 
restrictive policies, particularly as regards border enforcement (Fetzer 2006; Milner and 
Tingley 2008). Democratic politicians, on the other hand, have stronger prefernces for the 
legalisation of illegal immigrants, due to the fact that immigrants are part of their electorate 
(Lopez and Minushkin 2008). Thus, Republicans search for venues where they do not 
encounter liberal veto players. The state level is particularly well-suited for restrictive change, 
as Republicans hold the majorities in state legislatures2. The democrats can circumvent 
restrictive veto players through Executive Presidential Orders which the President can pass 
without any interference of the opposing party in Congress.   
 
3. The Problem Stream: An ineffective immigration system in times of economic crisis 
The US immigration system in the 2010s is characterized as „bad for migrants, employers and 
the national interest“ (Martin 2011a: 24). This is especially due to high hurdles immigrants 
face: Unless they have family-ties to US citizens, it is quite difficult to immigrate to the US. 
However, even those who are eligible for family-based immigration are confronted with long 
waiting periods due to a backlog (Council on Foreign Relations 2009: 51). Visa streams for 
high- and low-skilled immigrants are criticized as they do not match business demands 
adequately and are overly complex (ibid.: 50-59; Hansen 2009: 11-13; Hanson 2009: 4). In 
addition, a large number of unauthorized immigrants entered the country in the past two 
decades of which some moved to states that haven’t had experiences with immigration so far 
(Jones-Correa 2012: 4)3. The latest estimates of January 2012 suggest an overall number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In	  2008	  and	  2010	  the	  Republicans	  controlled	  14	  state	  legislatures	  but	  managed	  to	  increase	  this	  number	  up	  to	  
27	  in	  2012	  (see	  NCSL	  2015).	  
3	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  Jones-­‐Correa	  (2012)	  the	  seven	  states	  with	  the	  largest	  growth	  in	  immigrant	  population	  
(North	  Carolina,	  Georgia,	  Arkansas,	  Nevada,	  Tennessee,	  South	  Carolina,	  and	  Nebraska)	  in	  the	  period	  from	  1990	  
to	  2009	  haven’t	  “had	  attracted	  significant	  numbers	  of	  immigrants	  before	  1990”	  (4).	  What	  is	  more,	  Steil	  and	  
Vasi	  (2014:	  1134)	  showed	  that	  the	  Latino	  population	  growth	  is	  a	  strong	  and	  significant	  predictor	  of	  the	  
adoption	  of	  anti-­‐immigrant	  ordinances	  at	  the	  local	  level	  in	  the	  period	  from	  2006	  to	  2011.	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11.4 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the US with a share of 59% being of 
Mexican origin (Baker and Rytina 2013). Interestingly, it is estimated that 30-45% of the 
unauthorized population legally entered the country but then overstayed their visa (Hanson 
2009: 3; Pew 2006). The economic crisis hit legal and, in particular, unauthorized immigrants 
most severe as sectors that employed many immigrants (i.e. construction, retail and food) 
were highly affected by the economic downturn (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2010: 44-46; 
Tilly 2011: 679; Green and Winters 2010: 1068). The outcome of the economic crisis were 
stagnating numbers in the (estimated) population of unauthorized immigrants and decreasing 
illegal immigration (Hoefer, Rytina, Baker 2012: 1).  
The last major legislative reforms addressing shortcoming of the US immigration system were 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 1996 (Schain 2012: 
210-215; Migration Policy Institute 2013). While the IRCA tried to tackle the situation of a 
growing population of undocumented immigrants with an amnesty and employer sanctions, 
the Immigration Act of 1990 aimed especially at skilled workers with the creation of the H-1B 
visa program (ibid.; 104 Stat. 4978, §205). In addition, the IIRIRA combined greater border 
enforcement with a cut of social security benefits for immigrants (i.e. Social Security Federal 
public benefits; 110, Stat. 3009; see also Newton 2008: 53-63). Moreover, the IIRIRA 
enabled “local and state police (…) to enforce federal immigration law” (Varsanyi 2010: 2) 
under provision 287(g)4. Nevertheless, the IRCA was unsuccessful in diminishing the inflow 
of illegal workforce and the Immigration Act of 1990 played its part in making the system 
more complex (Schain 2012: 213; Martin 2011b: 80). Not surprisingly, the widely 
acknowledged problems of the current US immigration policies also influence public opinion: 
The Pew Research Center (2013: 2) found that 75% of the respondents see the need for at 
least major changes in the US immigration system. More precisely, the same survey observed 
that while three-fourths of the respondents want a possibility for unauthorized immigrants to 
stay legally (73%) and think that the government can do more to reduce illegal immigration (a 
lot more: 53%; somewhat more: 30%), there is little consensus whether to increase or reduce 
legal immigration (increase: 25%, decrease: 36%).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  IIRIRA	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  devolution	  in	  the	  field	  of	  immigration	  policies.	  
Additionally,	  the	  Personal	  Responsibility	  and	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act	  (PRWORA)	  and	  the	  
Antiterrorism	  and	  Effective	  Death	  Penalty	  Act	  (both	  also	  1996)	  were	  part	  of	  this	  development.	  While	  the	  
PRWORA	  cut	  down	  legal	  immigrants’	  eligibility	  for	  social	  services	  (i.e.	  Food	  Stamps,	  Medicaid)	  and	  “devolved	  
authority	  over	  select	  social	  services	  to	  the	  states”	  (Varsanyi	  2010:	  2),	  the	  latter	  “gave	  local	  police	  the	  authority	  
to	  arrest	  previously	  deported	  noncitizen	  felons”	  (ibid.).	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4. The Policy Stream: Ideas for the reform of an ineffective immigration policy 
Against the background of the picture drawn in the previous section, a comprehensive 
immigration reform (CIR) becomes a compelling solution to the problems of the US 
immigration system. The next section shows what the CIR as the major policy idea for re-
establishing effectiveness of US immigration policy entailed and how actors’ preferences 
coincided or collided with the CIR in times of economic crisis. The crisis can be considered 
the crucial event that finally buried the CIR as a policy response and fix to the ineffective 
immigration policy of the US. The next two sections explain how actor positions on the CIR 
became ever more divisive during the crisis leading to deadlock in Congress. However, due to 
rising problem pressure actors adopted parts of the CIR at venues other than the Congress.  
Since the 2000s various forms of comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) have been 
debated in the US (for a history of proposed CIRs cf. Rosenblum 2011). Moreover, two 
presidents supported a CIR, by now, with little effect (Hanson 2009: 3). ‘Comprehensive 
immigration reform’ does not only entail the promise of fixing an ineffective immigration 
policy but also insinuates that actors could agree more easily on a package deal rather than 
individual policy. Comprehensiveness means that every major stakeholder’s primary interest 
would be achieved while at the same time the adoption of all policies would entail 
compromises on actors’ positions. (Freeman 2009: 65-69; Rosenblum 2011: 10-13). CIRs 
entailed – in different compositions - “increased enforcement, a guest worker scheme and a 
path to legalization” (Freeman 2009: 69; Rosenblum 2011: 1). These three elements of 
immigration reform are key areas of US immigration policy. First, the call for increased 
enforcement touches upon border control, primarily at the southern US border, and stepping 
up internal control measures by means of ID and status checks at the work place (“E-verify”) 
as well as in public places. Second, the expansion of guest worker schemes is meant to 
broaden the legal channel for the temporal demand for low- and highly-skilled labor. Such 
measures accommodate the demands of industry and business for a steady supply of labor. 
Third, by legalisation the estimated ten to twelve million undocumented migrants in the US 
would be getting the opportunity to legalise their status. Interestingly, points that are also 
debated, namely the significance of family-reunification or the problem of visa-overstaying, 
do not expand into proposals for a CIR. The rationale of a CIR is to get the approval of all 
stakeholders by implementing parts of their agenda (Marquez and Witte 2009: 3). 
Accordingly, actors worried by the level of undocumented immigration should be won for the 
reform by the plan to step up border control and internal enforcement. An amnesty on a broad 
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scale could win the consent of unions and civil rights groups, traditionally concerned with 
measures protecting people from exploitation. Employers’ interest in labour supply is met by 
the offer of temporary labour migration programmes (Freeman 2009: 65-69; Rosenblum 
2011: 10-13).  
From the background of crisis, in 2012 actors that promoted either legalization of 
undocumented immigrants or temporary labour migration for skilled and unskilled workers 
felt that they had a harder time lobbying for their cause (Interview Chamber of Commerce, 
National Council of la Raza (NCLR)). Left, liberal, and actors of the right see the crisis as a 
reason for an increasing polarization of opinions in the immigration policy area. In particular, 
those parts of the comprehensive immigration reform package are met with resistance that do 
not only debate closure but also legalization of the undocumented and openness for select 
groups of migrant workers. Concerning the debate, representatives of think tanks leaning to 
the left and right confirm that immigration has become a highly politicized topic. A policy 
advisor from the left leaning think tank, the National Immigration Forum, confirms, that “It is 
controversial to talk about the idea of foreign born individuals coming to the US when there 
are people here who are struggling to survive, who are native born Americans.” Using 
stronger language, but making a similar observation, a representative from the more 
conservative Center for Immigration Studies holds that “people do not have jobs, and they see 
illegal aliens having jobs. And we, as Americans, do not have them. So, there are numbers of 
levels of outrage, that have caused devastation.”  
The sensitivity of the topic was reflected in the agenda of the Democratic and Republican 
party platforms that competed in the presidential election in 2012. In this regard, a unionist 
observed: “political campaigns avoid the topic like the plague. You will see very little about 
immigration, if anything at all, in the current presidential campaign. From the politicians’ 
standpoint, immigration is just a divisive issue on all sides (Interview AFL-CIO). The crisis 
co-occurs with policy deadlock in Congress and highlights the ‘divisiveness’ of actors over 
immigration policy reform. The crisis increased pressure for change but compromise among 
actors proofed to be impossible since defection and maintenance of the status quo was more 
beneficial for actors than cooperation. This uncompromising stance in combination with 
institutional constraints in congressional politics reinforced deadlock over immigration 
reform. Why positions among actors are irreconcilable and how the pressure for change 
promoted shifting venues for immigration reforms will be shown in the next section.    
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5. The Politics Stream: Why there is deadlock in Congress over immigration reform 
The economic crisis put a halt to immigration reform efforts at the federal level (Rosenblum 
2011: 12). Moreover, the US Congress is not only divided on content but also blocked 
institutionally. The US political system contains “multiple veto points” (Rosenblum 2011: 11; 
Hansen 2009: 13): For instance, the presidential veto or the Senate filibuster (Martin 2013). 
US bicameralism makes it necessary that both Houses agree on a bill to become law. In the 
US system politicians’ interest representation does not necessarily overlap with general party 
positions. Even though Democrats have a broader immigrant constituency than Republicans 
determining a more pro-immigration and pro-rights attitude, US politics leave room for very 
local and specific interests (Interview Republican Senator). Positions of politicians in the 
House of Representatives or Senate are defined by the interest of the respective constituency 
as well as business, unions, and other groups in these constituencies (Facchini and Steinhardt 
2011: 735). This means assuming Republicans would show a tough stance on undocumented 
migration and call for border enforcement while Democrats would all be in favour of 
immigration and the granting of rights to the undocumented hardly meets a complex reality. 
In fact, Republicans that are open to the interests of business in their constituency, for 
example the agriculture, hotel, and tourism industry, can turn a blind eye on efforts for border 
enforcement against illegal immigration. Similarly, the Democrats’ assumed liberal stance on 
immigration into the US could be obstructed by organized labour, claiming the depression of 
wages due to immigration (Interview AILA). Accordingly, there can be divisiveness on 
immigration within parties. At the same time, the presidential election in 2012 showed that 
candidates largely coincided with their respective party platforms: President Obama as well as 
Governor Romney generally agreed on legal and skilled immigration; however Obama and 
the Democrats were in favour of comprehensive immigration reform, while Republicans and 
their candidate put priority on immigration enforcement (Boyer 2012).  
 
Reconciliation among the political groups becomes even more difficult considering the 
interests and influence of the main stakeholders: business and unions. We interviewed 
representatives of two union umbrella organisations: AFL-CIO (American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organisations) representing 13.5 million workers and the 
smaller Change to Win federation (4.2 million members) who speaks for many Latino 
workers. Both unions strongly support an immigration reform that focuses on the rights of 
workers, migrant as well as native workers. The unions’ policy to improve access to rights as 
well as working conditions is the legalization of the undocumented, opposition to temporary 
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guest worker programmes, and a focus on worksite enforcement instead of border 
enforcement. For a representative of AFL-CIO, the essence of immigration reform boils down 
to “employer accountability” (Interview AFL-CIO). If migrant workers are able to claim 
rights with their employer and these rights are enforced at the worksite exploitation of 
workers because of unfair working conditions can be reduced. Hence, an amnesty for the 
undocumented is an indispensable condition for claiming rights (Interview Change to Win). 
For unions, border enforcement is less of an issue as long as illegal employment is contained. 
Employment opportunities for undocumented create an incentive for crossing the border 
illegally. Unions criticize employers for “fabricating” labour shortages in order to claim for 
the expansion of temporary worker programmes (Interview AFL-CIO). Those programmes 
are not only said to affect wages negatively (Borjas 2005) but also to put the migrant worker 
in a dependent relationship with the employer since working contract and residence status are 
combined (Interview AFL-CIO). The rights focus of unions as well as an interest in gaining 
more members explains their opposition to temporary labour migration schemes and lobby for 
legalization. Thus, they rather keep the status quo than compromise their position on 
temporary labour migration.  
 
On the employers’ side, the US Chamber of Commerce representing the interest of 3 million 
American businesses, immigration is considered to be a tool for securing the economy’s 
supply with labour. The focus of employers’ lobbying efforts is on expanding temporary 
worker programmes, for highly as well as lesser skilled migrant workers. In this regard, 
opposition towards the unions’ position is strongest (Interview US Chamber of Commerce). 
The Chamber sees measures that improve worksite enforcement of immigration and labour 
law critical but is not opposed to them. Employers claim a system that only applies to new 
hires leaving room to maintain undocumented employees in their workforce. However, this 
would not mean opposition to legalisation of undocumented immigrants. Employers have an 
interest in a “stable workforce”.5 The argument in favour of legalisation builds on 
immigrants’ contribution to the economy and compliance with a set of “strict criteria” that 
would allow undocumented migrants to earn citizenship.6 A steady supply of workers in all 
sectors fuels production and keeps wages, also for the highly skilled, lower (Borjas 2005). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  “Priorities	  for	  2014”,	  
www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2014_policy_priorities-­‐september_2014.pdf,	  accessed	  10	  October	  
2014	  
6	  See	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  “Fixing	  our	  Broken	  Immigration	  System”	  
http://immigration.uschamber.com/uploads/sites/400/Summary%20Immigration%20Priorities%20in%20the%
20House%207-­‐16-­‐2013.pdf,	  accessed	  10	  October	  2014	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Although US employers face strong opposition from unions with regard to temporary labour 
migration programmes common ground on the issue of legalisation can be observed. 
Therefore, legalization is the area in which policy output was most likely.  
 
For the US Chamber of Commerce, immigration is part of the “American Fabric” which, 
managed in an orderly way, has an overwhelmingly positive impact on economy and society. 
Whether immigration still is “vitally important to the success” (National Immigration Forum) 
of the US is questioned by some actors. The position of two lobby groups, Numbers USA as 
well as FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform) show how a high level of 
immigration to the US and suggestions for regulatory reform have become a heavily contested 
issue. The positions of FAIR and Numbers USA would mean a radical change to the idea of 
immigration as being part of the American Fabric. They want to substantially lower 
immigration levels and push strongly for the enforcement angle of the comprehensive 
immigration reform. As a consequence, no compromise on a comprehensive reform package 
is possible since expansion of admission for temporary workers and legalization of 
undocumented workers are fundamentally opposed. 
 
Both groups argue that high levels of immigration impact negatively on social justice in the 
US as well as on the environment. Population growth based on immigration is said to have a 
negative impact on wages, the distribution of welfare benefits as well as the environment in 
the US. The latter point of criticism is based on “urban sprawl” related to population growth 
and needs for housing. Roy Beck, an environmentalist and founder of Numbers USA sees the 
American worker with lower skills and lower education being harmed by immigration. 
Pressure on wages particularly in the low-skilled sector would contribute to massive social 
injustice. At the same time, immigrants are blamed for being “net users of government 
services” (Interview Numbers USA). The same relationship between immigration and local 
poverty is made by FAIR: “We cannot afford to support the impoverished ranks if we 
continue to keep bringing in more and more. We do have a responsibility to the people of the 
US who are poor or do not have health insurance.” Concerning the economic crisis it is 
criticized that immigration policy does not respond to changes in supply and demand for 
workers on the labour market. “We are admitting the same number of people now our 
unemployment is over 8 per cent, as we did when it was under 5 per cent. […] how do we fix 
the immigration system that addresses the needs we have in this country?” (Interview FAIR). 
Both groups’ aim for “population stability” the end of population growth induced by 
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immigration.  This would entail the reduction of immigration to one quarter of its current size 
of one million admissions per year. In order to achieve this threshold, the green card and 
diversity lotteries would be abolished, family based migration would be reduced to spouses 
and children only, and border and worksite enforcement increased. Immigration would not be 
stopped, because in terms of labour migration, a strict focus on immigration of the highly 
skilled is claimed. According to their own evaluation FAIR and Numbers USA were 
successful in lobbying Congress against legalisations of undocumented (Interview FAIR and 
Numbers USA). Both lobby groups, consider the status quo in US immigration regulation, 
which actually allows a million people each year to immigrate, to benefit the party families 
and business interests. Since immigrants are likely to increase the Democrats’ electorate and 
Republicans please their “backbone”, the industry and business with a steady supply of 
labour, change cannot be expected from the Congress (Interview Numbers USA).  
 
 
Figure 1. Interest group positions on immigration reform 
 
Figure 1 provides information on interest groups and their objectives in a CIR. Points at the 
outer side of the triangle indicate support of i.e. stricter enforcement measures, while points in 
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the center show interest group position against this part of CIR. As explained above 
stakeholders’ and interest groups’ positions are extremely divisive on the issue. On the one 
hand, the Latino civil rights organization NCLR and the labor union AFL-CIO support an 
amnesty for unauthorized immigrants already residing in the US while being opposed to 
extended enforcement. Their liberal position is partly supported by the US Chamber of 
Commerce. They, however, strongly favor temporary labor migration programmes that are 
not supported by the unions. On the other hand of the “ideological (…) divide” (Marquez and 
Witte 2009: 20), the nativist organizations FAIR and Numbers US are opposed to any part of 
CIR but extended enforcement.  
 
Studying actors’ divisiveness over a comprehensive immigration reform Martin (2011a: 25) 
holds that the status quo “is the second-best option for those who cannot achieve their first-
choice solution” as “most unauthorized migrants get the higher wage jobs they seek and most 
employers get work done cheaper with such migrants” (ibid.: 17)7. Therefore, he observes 
“talk but no action” (ibid.: 32) in times of crisis. We contest this argument and show how 
actors searched for alternative venues to bring about change in immigration policy.  
 
6. In Search of New Venues: Immigration control at the state level and executive orders by 
the President 
The claim that US politics was completely unable to produce legislative change is slightly 
inaccurate. Change can be observed, however, not induced by policy making in Congress. 
Immigration policy-making shifts to the US states as well as the President (Varsanyi 2010). 
Against the procedural rules that are laid down in the constitution, the “states take 
immigration into their own hands” (Interview Immigration Policy Center). Such policy 
devolution can be observed in southern US states most affected by illegal border crossers. 
Recent anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona and Alabama that aim against undocumented 
immigrants’ access to government services such as education or infrastructure, have caused 
concern among policy observers (Boyer 2012: 1). Not only are states overstepping their 
competences in this field, state legislation is overwhelmingly targeted at Latinos causing fear 
of a backlash against workers from Mexico or central America (Interview National 
Immigration Forum). In addition, anti-immigrant ordinances issued by municipalities (local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  A	  similar	  explanation	  for	  the	  inability	  reform	  is	  put	  forward	  by	  Hanson	  (2009).	  
	   14	  
level) are constantly on the rise since the failures of comprehensive immigration reform (Steil 
and Vasi 2014: 1110; Varsanyi 2010: 11).  
 
Since the late nineteenth century, immigration policy-making laid in the hands of the federal 
government. Only recently “state and local immigration policy activism has exploded” 
(Varsanyi 2010: 9). This devolution was made possible by the 104th Congress under 
Republican majority through three, aforementioned, legislative acts that passed Congress in 
1996: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Varsanyi 2010: 2). However, state and local actors 
did not use these newly created possibilities immediately by (ibid.). Varsanyi (2010: 11) 
argues that politicians became more active on the state and local level to “earn political capital 
on the issue of immigration reform”. Only the repeated failures to reform the immigration 
system “opened a veritable Pandora’s Box of state and local immigration control initiatives 
seeking to fill the policy void” (Cornelius 2010: vii). In fact, in the presidential elections in 
2012 it could be observed that Republicans are critical of the effectiveness of federal 
measures for immigration enforcement and push for devolution to the state level. In contrast, 
Democrats are opposed to state government attempts to take on immigration enforcement 
(Boyer 2012).  
 
Another example for a shift in venues is executive orders adopted by the President. Those 
orders supersede majorities in the Congress and again highlight the inability of Congress to 
legislate. The Dream Act, which would have legalized the status of young “deserving” 
undocumented migrants, did not gain a majority in the Senate. Republican Senators blocked 
the bill in 2010. By executive order President Obama bypassed approval of the Congress 
allowing for deferred action, pending the deportation, for this specific group in August 2012. 
Among others, requirements for qualification are that undocumented youth must have no 
criminal record and pursue either serving in the military or higher education. The justification 
for the original bill was not only based on moral grounds such as fairness; the group in 
question was brought to the country by their parents and thus had not broken immigration law 
intentionally. But also, the White House referred to the economic crisis and the positive 
budgetary implications that legalization of this group would entail: “President Obama beliefs 
that […] an important part of rebuilding our economy [...] is making our immigration system 
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functional, efficient, and accountable.” 8 Economic and security needs justified pressing for 
passage of comprehensive immigration reform as well as the DREAM Act. It was calculated 
that passing the DREAM Act would bring $ 2.2 billion revenue over ten years (ibid: 20-21). 
Eventually the DREAM Act did not pass but the President’s executive order on “Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals” had the same intention.9 The executive order was not only the 
adoption of a first piece of the deadlocked comprehensive immigration reform but also framed 
as response to the crisis. In that sense not only venue shopping could be observed but also the 
intersection of policy, problem and politics streams. The executive order offered a new 
political venue for decision-making: the unresolved problem of the undocumented immigrant 
population gained fiscal urgency during the crisis and met with a policy that had been debated 
for quite some time. Some actors claimed their lobbying efforts of the Obama administration 
for this executive order (Change to Win, NCLR). The unions, civil rights groups and 
organisations that represent Latino interests welcomed the Presidents initiative as a first step 
for large scale legalization (ACLU, AFL-CIO, Change to Win, NCLR). Others criticized that 
the executive order bypassed Congress in order to win the vote of the Latino Community in 
the election year (Republican Senator, FAIR). And, restriction minded groups feared that 
deferred action allowing for the Dream Act to be executed would be the wedge for 
comprehensive immigration reform (FAIR).  
 
State legislation on immigration as well as executive orders indicate a shift in venues for 
immigration policy making: enforcement is decided on the state level and legalisation of the 
undocumented is executed in bypassing a Congressional majority. Among the suggested 
policies that are part of a comprehensive immigration reform unions and employers would 
only agree on legalisation, enforcement was not on their agenda and temporary immigration 
of workers heavily contested. Accordingly, the President maintained the status quo and opted 
for a piecemeal approach on legalisation. Observers from the left deemed this approach as the 
only way forward in a deadlocked Congress (Interview Change to Win, AFL-CIO, AILA, 
ACLU).  
 
7. Conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  White	  House	  for	  the	  Hispanic	  Community	  from	  2012:	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/hispanic_agenda_final.pdf,	  accessed	  17	  December	  
2014	  
9	  For	  the	  details	  of	  the	  program	  see	  the	  website	  of	  the	  department	  of	  homeland	  security:	  
http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-­‐action-­‐childhood-­‐arrivals,	  accessed	  17	  December	  2014	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This paper set off to answer the question of what is the impact of the economic and financial 
crisis on immigration policies in the United States, a country that has been hit hard by this 
crisis. We find that the crisis has highlighted policy problems that have been present before 
and aggravated these problems. US immigration policies have been described as “bad for 
migrants, employers and the national interest” (Martin 2011a: 24). Yet, a CIR is stuck in 
Congress given absence of strong majorities and the divergent preferences of Republicans and 
Democrats. With policy ideas for each liberal and restrictive change being present for a long 
time and with the problem stream aggravating, i.e. on the one hand the increasing problems of 
illegal border-crossings and on the other hand the hardship of people who have no access to 
any rights at all based on their illegal status, both policy proponents of liberalisation and 
restriction look for alternative venues to pursue their policy aims. Republicans who hold the 
majorities in most state legislatures pass restrictive policies on the state level where they do 
not encounter liberal veto players. Points in case are the 287(g) agreements between the US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies (ICE) and local enforcement partners 
(police) which are by now in place in 17 states (ICE 2014; Coleman 2012), municipality and 
city ordinances (Steil and Vasi 2014; Varsanyi 2008).  As far as the Democrats are concerned, 
the Presidential Decrees, e.g. the deferred action on childhood arrivals from 2012 and others 
passed by President Barack Obama in 2014 can equally be considered as an attempt to forum-
shop for policy venues where no restrictive veto-players can be found (Migration Policy 
Institute 2014).  
 
The contribution of this article is two-fold: On the one hand we have theorized the current 
situations of deadlock on the CIR and policy change on the state levels which have been 
widely discussed but so far not comprehensively explained. On the other hand, we show that  
the crisis has rather aggravated or highlighted problems that have been present since a long 
time. Thus, the crisis cannot be considered the root of current policy change, but rather a 
moderating variable amplifying the problem pressure that entailed change.  
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Appendix 1 
Interest	  group	   Admission	   Enforcement	   Amnesty	  
	   Permanent	  legal	  immigration	  	  
=	  Family	  
Economic	  Migration	  
	  
Temporary	  workers	   More	  intense	  
border	  control,	  
apprehension	  and	  
deportation,	  local	  
enforcement	  by	  
States	  
E-­‐verify	  
“employer	  
verification”1	  
Legalization,	  Dream	  
Act	  
(DACA,	  deferred	  
action	  for	  childhood	  
arrivals)	  
AFL-­‐CIO	  	  
(labor	  union)	  
Yes	  
Labour	  immigration	  should	  strictly	  work	  
on	  labour	  shortages	  
No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Change	  to	  Win	   Yes	  
=permanent	  legal	  immigration	  
No	   No	   No	   Yes	  
Chamber	  of	  
Commerce	  
Yes,	  but	  shift	  focus	  
to	  employment	  
Yes,	  reduce	  per	  
country	  caps,	  first	  
come	  first	  serve	  
based	  on	  skills	  
Yes	   No	  
borders	  need	  to	  be	  
secure	  but	  be	  not	  
be	  sealed	  
Yes	  and	  No	  
More	  critical	  than	  
supportive,	  
System	  should	  work	  
in	  a	  manageable	  
way	  
Yes	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Numbers	  US	   Yes,	  for	  spouses	  and	  minor	  
children,	  no	  chain	  migration,	  	  
Lower	  ceilings,	  open	  to	  skilled,	  
cut	  the	  diversity	  and	  green	  
card	  lottery	  
Yes	   Yes	   NO	  
FAIR	   Lower	  ceilings	  overall,	  focus	  on	  skills	   Yes	   Yes	   No	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Interest	  group	   Admission	   Enforcement	   Amnesty	  
AILA	   Yes	  
Family	  migration	  as	  well	  as	  
economic	  migration	  is	  
supported	  
Yes	  	  
Facilitations	  for	  temporary	  
worker	  programs	  are	  
demanded	  
No	  increase	  in	  
control	  	  
No,	  
E-­‐verify	  is	  flawed	  
and	  puts	  	  a	  burden	  
on	  business	  
Yes	  
National	  
Immigration	  Forum	  
Yes	  on	  all	  issues	   No	  	  
Further	  
enforcement,	  
control	  intensity	  
and	  costs	  are	  too	  
high	  already	  
NO	  
Do	  not	  punish	  
workers	  for	  an	  
immigration	  system	  
that	  does	  not	  work	  
Yes	  
Center	  for	  
Immigration	  Studies	  
-­‐	  Lower	  ceilings	  
-­‐	  saturation	  point	  reached	  with	  
immigration	  
-­‐	  get	  rid	  of	  family	  unity	  
-­‐	  focus	  on	  people	  
who	  can	  help	  the	  
economy	  get	  going	  
again	  
Yes	   Yes	  
Keep	  illegal	  aliens	  
from	  being	  hired	  
No	  
ACLU	   Yes	  
Family	  reunification	  
is	  a	  human	  right	  
Not	  really	  their	  
focus,	  but	  
Yes	  
Not	  really	  their	  
focus,	  but	  
Yes	  
For	  skilled	  and	  
unskilled	  
No	  	  
More	  
intensification,	  
against	  state	  level	  
immigration	  control	  
No	  
Concerns	  about	  
privacy	  and	  
accuracy	  of	  the	  
system	  
Yes	  
National	  Council	  of	  
la	  Raza	  
Yes	  
-­‐	  in	  favour	  of	  family	  
reunification	  
Not	  really	  their	  
focus,	  but	  	  
Yes	  
-­‐	  permenant	  labour	  
migration	  better	  
than	  temporary	  
Yes	  
-­‐	  particularly	  for	  
seasonal	  workers	  
No	  
-­‐	  against	  states	  
enforcing	  
immigration	  law	  
-­‐	  against	  further	  
intensification	  of	  
control	  
No	  
-­‐	  will	  hurt	  Latino	  
workers	  and	  Latino	  
small	  businesses	  
Yes	  
 
1 Employer verification systems are used to check workers employment eligibility (now referred to as E-Verify) (see Rosenblum 2011: 6). 
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Appendix 2: Institutional affiliation of interviewees  
Institutional affiliations of US interviewees Date of Interview 
 Washington D.C. 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) 11 September 2012 
Immigration Policy Center 11 September 2012 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 11 September 2012, 
15 October 2012 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 12 September 2012 
US Chamber of Commerce 13 September 2012 
Numbers USA 13 September 2012 
Change to Win 14 September 2012 
Republican Senator 17 September 2012 
National Immigration Forum 17 September 2012 
Center for Immigration Studies 18 September 2012 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 18 September 2012 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) 19 September 2012 
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